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INNOVATION, ACCESS AND THE PUBLIC'S
HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN MEXICO AND THE
TB EPIDEMIC
Pamela Das*
ATENT laws have stirred a substantial amount of controversy on
the international scene. The pharmaceutical industry views patent
law as a necessary tool to encourage innovation and the develop-
ment of new drugs, because profit incentives provide the pharmaceutical
companies with a basis for investing in costly development processes.'
On the other hand, many developing countries argue that implementing
patent laws for pharmaceutical products should be prohibited because
"access to pharmaceutical products is so important that the products
themselves should not be patented."' 2 Furthermore, the World Health
Organization (WHO) notes that even with patent laws, a significant pro-
portion of the world's population has yet to derive benefit from pharma-
ceutical innovation because of weak supply and price barriers. 3 From
1975 to 1999, drugs for diseases such as tuberculosis (TB) and malaria
represented only sixteen of the 1393 drugs marketed.4 Currently, 90 per-
cent of pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) goes towards
the health problems of 10 percent of the global population.5 Much of the
drug development goes toward lifestyle drugs, such as Rogaine, Viagra,
and diet pills. 6 Much of the emphasis placed on lifestyle drugs is because
of the narrow perspective of pharmaceutical companies. As a former
Merck CEO put it, "there are more well people than sick people. We
should make products for people who are well."'7 In addition to lifestyle
*Pamela Das received her Bachelor's of Arts from Wellesley College and her
Master's in Public Health from Boston University. She is currently pursuing her
JD at SMU Dedman School of Law, with an anticipated graduation date of May
2009.
1. John H. Barton, TRIPS and the Global Pharmaceutical Market, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
May-June 2004, at 146.
2. Id. at 147.
3. 56TH WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, WHO Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation
and Public Health, Agenda Item 14.9, May 28 2003, http://www.who.int/phi/
A5617.pdf.
4. Chenxi Jiao, The Negative Effect of Pharmaceutical Patents on South African In-
dustry, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 665, 665 (2007).
5. Peter Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 842 (2007).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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drugs, there has also been significant investment in developing and refin-
ing drugs that address diseases prevalent in the developed world, such as
cancer, diabetes, and heart disease. 8 While there has been some research
into tropical diseases, much of the treatment has focused on prophylactic
vaccines for people of the developed world who travel into foreign coun-
tries, instead of developing drugs for people in the developing world who
actually suffer from the diseases. 9
This Note focuses on the Mexican pharmaceutical industry because a
strong relationship exists between the health of Mexico and the health of
United States because of immigration. Furthermore, the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which governs trade between Mex-
ico and the United States, offers a unique perspective of how free trade
agreements can shape international pharmaceutical policy. This Note
looks specifically at the effects of pharmaceutical patents on anti-tubercu-
losis drugs, as this area is still unexplored. Part I of this Note gives an
overview of tuberculosis at a global level, while Part II addresses the spe-
cific problem of TB in Mexico. Part III describes the current perspectives
of how pharmaceutical patents affect access to medicine. Part IV re-
counts the historical rise of patents, and the subsequent pressure put on
the international community to harmonize. Parts V, VI, and VII detail
more specifically the implementation of global patent laws through
NAFTA, TRIPS, and DOHA, respectively. This is followed by Part VIII,
which describes the Mexican pharmaceutical market and its transforma-
tion after international patent laws were implemented. In the last major
section, the Note attempts to hypothesize how international patent laws
will affect the Mexican pharmaceutical industry and the Mexican popula-
tion's access to TB drugs.
I. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT OF TB
Tuberculosis continues to be a great public health problem to this day,
and it kills "young and middle-aged adults faster than any other disease
apart from [AIDS]." 10 "The World Health Organization estimates that
one third of the world's population is infected with... tuberculosis."11 In
2005, there were approximately 8.8 million new cases of tuberculosis and
greater than 1.5 million deaths due to the disease. 12
The pressing public health problem of tuberculosis demands the crea-
tion of new drugs and greater access to tuberculosis medications. When
effective drugs are available, tuberculosis cure rates exceed 90 percent;
however, in the absence of effective drugs or inadequate compliance with
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Richard J. O'Brien & Paul P. Nunn, The Need for New Drugs Against Tuberculo-
sis, 167 AM. J. RESPIR'Y & CRIT. CARE MED. 1055, 1055 (2001).
11. Elizabeth A Talbot et al., Tuberculosis Among Foreign-Born Persons in the United
States, 1993-1998, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS'N, 2894, 2894 (2000).
12. WHO Global Fact Sheet, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fsl04/en/.
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a TB drug regime, cure rates drop dramatically. 13 The fact that mortality
rates from tuberculosis hover close to two million indicates that many
people across the world "do not have access to or do not take effective
treatment for this widespread disease."' 4
The inability or reluctance of people to comply with a TB drug regime
is creating a greater public health challenge of multidrug-resistant tuber-
culosis (MDRTB). 15 MDRTB is tuberculosis resulting from bacteria that
are "resistant to at least isoniazid and rifampicin,"' 16 two drugs that are
considered essential medicines by the WHO. 17 Tuberculosis drug resis-
tance can be broken down into two different types: primary resistance
and acquired resistance.' 8 Primary resistance occurs when an individual
is infected with a drug resistant TB strain for the first time, while ac-
quired resistance occurs when an individual shows resistance after a prior
treatment. 19 The existence of primary resistance reveals a greater prob-
lem of "past programmatic frailties." 20
Global epidemiological evidence about MDRTB is sparse and under-
researched.21 With the current evidence based on data from sixty-four
countries, however, the annual incidence of MDRTB was estimated to be
273,000 cases. 22 Future projections estimate that the annual incidence
rate of drug resistant TB "may climb and that concerted efforts to control
MDRTB will be required and make [sic] take years[,] if not decades[,] if
rates are to decline." 23
II. TUBERCULOSIS IN MEXICO AND THE U.S. PROBLEM
The epidemiology of tuberculosis in Mexico is of great concern to the
United States, as the proportion of TB cases in its foreign-born popula-
tion has increased from 21.6 percent to 61 percent between 1986 and
1992.24 According to another study, from 1993 to 1998, 64 percent of new
TB cases occurred among people born in the United States and 35.1 per-
cent occurred in foreign-born individuals.25 Approximately two-thirds of
the foreign-born individuals having TB came from one of seven countries:
13. Richard Laing & K.M. McGoldrick, Tuberculosis Drug Issues, Prices, Fixed-Dose
Combination Products and Second Line Drugs, 4 INT'L J. TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG
DISEASE 194, 102 (2000).
14. Id.
15. Richard Coker, Review: Multidrug-Resistant Tuberculosis: Public Health Chal-
lenges, 9 TROPICAL MED. & INT'L HEALTH 25, 25 (2004).
16. Id.
17. WHO Essential Medicine List, supra note 12.
18. Coker, supra note 15, at 25.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Teresa N. Quitugua et al., Transmission of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis in Texas
and Mexico, 40 J. CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY 2716, 2716 (2002).
25. Talbot, supra note 11, at 2895.
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Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, China, India, Haiti, and South Korea. 26
In Texas, California, and Illinois, Mexico was listed as the "'most com-
monly reported birth country for foreign-born person with TB."'27
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates the
incidence rate of tuberculosis in the United States in 2006 to be 5 cases
per 100,000 people. 28 It further estimates that 124 cases of multidrug
resistant cases of tuberculosis were reported in 2005.29 By contrast, in
Mexico the estimated TB incidence was 32 cases per 100,000 people, to-
taling 33,529 new cases of tuberculosis. 30 It is estimated that 2.4 percent
of these cases are new multidrug-resistant TB cases. 31 Similar to the
demographics of TB in other parts of the world, in certain parts of Mex-
ico TB appears to disproportionately affect "the poor, illiterate, rural,
and indigent populations". 32
Although the Direct Observation Treatment Short Course (DOTS)
strategy implemented by the WHO has been essential in tackling TB on a
global scale, in areas that are already plagued with a high prevalence of
MDRTB, the success of DOTS seems more uncertain. 33 For example, in
Southern Mexico studies indicate that one in three patients harbor resis-
tant strains to at least one of the TB drugs, despite the relatively good TB
control programs. 34 The major risk factors for the emergence of MDRTB
in Mexico are inappropriate drug regimens that contain too few drugs
and non-adherence to drug programs. 35 Other risk factors include "er-
ratic drug supplies, substandard drug quality, and unrestricted access to
anti-TB drugs through over-the-counter sales."'3 6
In Mexico, when a patient is diagnosed with TB a two-drug treatment
regimen is initiated. 37 Although "the [Center for Disease Control]
(CDC) and the American Thoracic Society recommend beginning . . .
treatment with a four-drug regimen" to prevent MDRTB, cost plays a
major role in limiting the regimen to less than four drugs. 38 "The current
3-drug regimen costs approximately $120 per complete treatment" and
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Trends in Tuberculosis Inci-
dence-United States 2006 (March 23, 2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/prex iew/mmwrhtml/mm5611a2.htm.
29. Id.
30. USAID, Tuberculosis Profile, Mexico, http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/global-
health/id/tuberculosis/countries/lac/mexico.pdf.
31. Id.
32. Maria de Lourdes Garcia-Garcia et al., Tuberculosis Epidemiology and Control in
Veracruz, Mexico, 28 INT'L J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 135, 139 (1999).
33. Maria de Lourdes Garcia-Garcia et al.. Clinical Consequences and Transmissibility
of Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis in Southern Mexico, 160 ARCHIVES INTERN. MED.
633, 633 (2000).
34. Id. at 633-34.
35. Rueben M. Granich et al., Survey of Drug Resistance of Mycobacterium Tuberculo-
sis in 3 Mexican States, 1997, 160 ARCHIVES INTERN. MED. 639, 640 (2000)
36. Id.
37. Id. at 643.
38. Id.
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adding the fourth drug "would increase this cost by approximately 30
[percent] per patient. 39
TB drug development is not only necessary to reduce morbidity and
mortality from MDRTB, but also to find a more effective first line treat-
ment that will shorten the duration of total treatment and/or allow for
-more widely spaced intermittent treatment," which would consequently
increase compliance. 40 "The current tuberculosis treatments regimens,
although highly effective, are far from ideal. '41 Even with the most "op-
timal combination of available drugs, the duration of treatment can-
not... [go] below six months."' 42 Furthermore, a patient on a TB regimen
must take four medications together for at least the first two months and
may consume more than ten tablets at one time. 43 Therefore, a drug
compound that decreases duration and the frequency of drug administra-
tion is invaluable. 44
In addition to the need for innovation of TB drugs, greater overall ac-
cess to TB drugs is needed to combat the TB pandemic. 45 A major con-
tributor to the lack of access is the price of drugs, which is influenced by a
variety of factors, such as prices set by the manufacturer, custom duties,
registration fees, taxes, and mark up values. 46 In the United States, over
the past twenty years U.S. private market "prices for first-line drugs in-
creased... [at] an average [rate] of 10.66 percent per year." 47
III. VIEWS ABOUT PATENTS AND ACCESS TO DRUGS
Many public health activists believe that implementing global patents
for pharmaceuticals will greatly curtail access to essential medicines be-
cause it will drastically increase prices by creating a monopoly on drugs.
Before discussing the implications of pharmaceutical patents on access to
medicine, a working knowledge of essential medicines is necessary. 48 Ac-
cording to the World Health Organization, "[e]ssential medicines are
those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population[;] [t]hey
are selected with due regard to public health relevance, evidence of effi-
cacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness. ' 49 The WHO cre-
ates and updates the list of essential medications with the hopes that
countries will implement their own national drug policies to make sure
that these medications are available for their population at affordable
39. Id.





45. Laing, supra note 13, at 198.
46. Id. at 199.
47. Id. at 200.
48. Richard Laing et al., Twenty Five Years of the WHO Essential Medicines List: Pro-
gress and Challenges, 361 LANCET 1723, 1723 (2003).
49. Id.
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prices. 50 Even with the existence of this list, however, nearly one-third of
the world's population lacks access to these essential medicines.5l
Many scholars argue that the patents are not responsible for the lack of
access because 95 percent of the drugs listed on the essential medicines
list are off-patent. 52 However, as Medecins Sans Fronteires (MSF), more
commonly known as Doctors Without Borders, notes, many medicines
that are life saving and essential are not on the essential medicine list
because they are too expensive. Furthermore, the reason that many of
these drugs are off-patent is because the patents have expired. If new
drugs are developed they will be subject to patent protection and subse-
quently higher cost. In addition, even with off-patent TB drugs, the
purchase price of these drugs can be feasibly dropped by 95 percent.53
Many claim that poverty, not patents, is the main contributor to lack of
access.54 Because developing countries contribute such little revenue to
pharmaceutical companies, on many occasions pharmaceutical companies
forgo patent protection.5 5 Much of this analysis, however, focuses on the
poorest African nations. 56 Middle income countries such as China, India,
Mexico, and South Africa, are target economies for pharmaceutical com-
panies; therefore, companies are less inclined to forgo patent protection
within these countries, which consequently results in higher prices. 57
Overall, "[i]n Latin America the cost of medicines has increased at a rate
faster than inflation. '58 In fact, despite a low per capita income, both
Mexico and Chile had prices comparable to that of the United King-
dom.59 The number of pharmaceuticals sold in many Latin American
countries has decreased even though drug expenditures increased. 60 This
discrepancy demonstrates that access to medicine is becoming more diffi-
cult. 61 Therefore, while poverty and lack of health care infrastructure
greatly contribute to the lack of access, the effect of patents on drug
prices is also a major consideration.
50. Id.
51. MSF Access Website, http://www.accessmed-msf.org.
52. Amir Attaran, How Do Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential
Medicines in Developing Countries?, HEALTH AFFAIRS 155, 157 (2004).
53. Interview by Barbara Bogaev with Dr. Paul Farmer, Medical Anthropologist,
Fresh Air from WHYY, NPR (Sept. 25, 2003), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=1446061 (at timestamp 13:32).




58. Nuria Homedes & Antonio Ugalde, Multisource Drug Policies in Latin America:
Survey of Ten Countries, 83 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 64, 64 (2005).
59. Patricia M. Danzon & Michael F. Furukawa, Prices and Availability of
Pharmaceuticals: Evidence from Nine Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS Web Exclu-
sive, at 527-28 (2003), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cg/reprint/hlthaff.w3.521v1.
pdf.
60. Homedes & Ugalde, supra note 58, at 64.
61. Id.
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IV. THE RISE OF PATENTS AND THE GROWING PRESSURE
ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HARMONIZE
In the United States, patents have been the cornerstone of the protec-
tion of property rights and have served as a "tool to provide an incentive
to technical progress. '62 Between 1981 and 2001 the number of patents
in the United States increased from 71,000 to 184,000, which amounts to a
159 percent increase. 63 Although innovation has been a common justifi-
cation for patenting, much of this increase is attributable to the intensifi-
cation of patenting rather than the creation of new inventions.64 In the
1990s, U.S. R&D increased by 41 percent, while the number of patents
granted increased by over 72 percent. 65 For many, the intensification of
patenting portrays a social good because it "stimulate[s] a flow of inven-
tions... [and] promote[s]... commercialisation to the wider economic ben-
efit of society. ' 66 But to others the proliferation of patents creates a
cause for alarm because patents can possibly restrict access through
higher prices and they can distort research priorities. 67
Because the high prices of drugs can be attributed to patents, once a
drug goes off-patent generic competition can decrease the price of the
drug dramatically. In response to this potential competition, pharmaceu-
tical companies have pursued expensive litigation "to delay or prevent
generic entry and to protect or extend a monopoly on a bestselling
drug." 68 Furthermore, the United States, under the strong pressure from
pharmaceutical companies, has conveyed a growing of fear of generic
producers internationally exporting drugs that pharmaceutical companies
have spent millions of dollars to develop. 69 The United States also ex-
pressed the concern of drug smuggling across borders, since many drugs
are not patented internationally and may be available for cheaper
prices. 70 Therefore, the United States put pressure on the international
community to harmonize patent laws and set minimum standards for pat-
ent protections that countries should respect.71
V. BEFORE TRIPS, CAME NAFTA: AN OVERVIEW
OF NAFTA
One of the attempts to harmonize patent laws internationally occurred
in 1994 with the implementation of the North American Free Trade
62. COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (U.K.), WIPO WTO TRIPS:





66. Id. at 113.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 36
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Agreement (NAFTA).72 The provision most relevant to pharmaceutical
drugs is Article 1709. 73 Article 1709 mandated the recognition of previ-
ously unrecognized patents for pharmaceutical products and processes.
Article 1709(1) of NAFTA demands that signatory countries must patent
"any invention whether products or processes in all fields of technology,
provided that such inventions are new, result from an inventive step[,]
and are capable of industrial application. ' 74 There are exceptions to pat-
ent rules, as seen in Article 1709 (3), which provides that a party can deny
protection for certain "diagnostic, therapeutic[,] and surgical methods for
the treatment of humans... [,] plants[,] and animals other than microor-
ganisms."'75 Exceptions, such as Article 1709(3), were troubling to the
United States because it feared that devices patentable in the United
States would not be given the same patent protection in the member
states.76 But Article 1709(5) gives the patent holder the power to "pre-
vent unauthorized parties from making, using[,] or selling subject matter
of a product patent and [can] prevent unauthorized parties from using the
process in selling, using[,] or importing products derived from [the] pat-
ent[ ] process."' 77 This power is not unlimited, as Article 1709(6) permits
signatory states to "provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights con-
ferred by a patent. '78 The exceptions, however, cannot be "unreasonably
[in] conflict with normal exploitation of a patent" and must "not unrea-
sonably prejudice legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking into ac-
count the legitimate interests of the other persons. '79
Another relevant change that NAFTA made regarding pharmaceutical
patents is the restriction on compulsory licensing.80 Prior to NAFTA,
Mexico would commonly use compulsory licensing as a way to make
cheap generics.81 But under Article 1709(7), signatory nations are re-
stricted from free access to compulsory licensing.82 Article 1709(10)
modifies 1709(7) and grants compulsory licenses under limited circum-
stances. 83 For example, for a compulsory license to be granted the appli-
cant "must have previously made an effort. . .to obtain authorization
from the patent holder and must have their case considered individually
before they would be allowed a compulsory license."' 84 Under the current
72. Gerardo Vazquez Gomez, The Liberalisation of Financial Services in Mexico and
its Relation with NAFTA, MEFTA and GATS, 11 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 49, 51
(2005)
73. Arlene Noral Farolan, Harmonization of Patent Systems of NAFTA Nations, 10
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 54, 59 (2001).
74. Id. at 59.
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Mexican pharmaceutical policy, compulsory licenses can be used only
under limited circumstances. 85
VI. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE CREATION OF
GLOBALIZED DRUG MARKET
In January 1995, through the initiative of the United States and other
developed countries, the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) agreement went into force in an attempt to change the
international pharmaceutical landscape and achieve greater patent pro-
tection on a global scale.86 The proponents of TRIPS were responding to
pressure by pharmaceutical companies who "viewed themselves as vic-
tims of 'piracy' in many markets throughout the world and wanted to gain
increased protection for their products. T87 The TRIPS agreement sets
minimal guidelines for the protection of intellectual property rights that
each member government must accord fellow World Trade Organization
(WTO) members. 88
One of the most pertinent provisions of TRIPS for pharmaceutical
companies is Article 27, which requires that patents "be available for any
inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology."8 9
Another important part of TRIPS is the requirements it set forth for the
use of compulsory licensing, which allows drug manufacturers to use a
patent without the patent holder's permission. 90 The TRIPS agreement
allows for the use of compulsory licenses when "the proposed user has
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable
commercial terms and conditions." 91 Moreover, Article 31 of the agree-
ment states that member nations can waive the reasonable commercial
efforts in "case[s] of a national emergency or other circumstances of ex-
treme urgency or in [the] case[ ] of public noncommercial use."'92 Com-
pulsory licensing is also limited to predominately supply the "domestic
market of the Member authorizing such use" and that the license is termi-
nated "when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are un-
likely to recur. '93
While TRIPS is a formal document, the purpose of the agreement was
never to have "all signatories adopt the TRIPS legal text word-for-word
85. Juan Bacalski, Mexico's Pharmaceutical Patent Dilemma and the Lesson of India,
23 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.717, 740 (2006).
86. Barton, supra note 1, at 147.
87. Id.
88. Jiao, supra note 4, at 661.
89. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1208.
90. Yu, supra note 5, at 860.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Yu, supra note 5, at 860-61.
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and adhere to it.''94 Rather, the TRIPS agreement is supposed to provide
minimum standards and goals, while allowing the individual countries to
integrate those standards into their own national legislation.95 Article 1
notes that member states are "free to determine the appropriate method
of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal
system."' 96 Therefore, member states are entitled to flexibility in deter-
mining their own national pharmaceutical policies and enforcement
mechanisms.97
VII. DOHA DECLARATION AND ADDRESSING PUBLIC
HEALTH NEEDS
As pandemics such as HIV/AIDS continue to grow and threaten the
existence of many nations, activists around the world demand a relaxa-
tion of the "stranglehold [that] patent holders h[o]ld over life-saving
medicines. '98 In 2001, Zimbabwe, on the behalf of Africa, "demanded
that the TRIPS council convene a special session on access to
medicines." 99 At this special session, the United States and European
Union advanced pro-pharmaceutical positions while developing countries
stressed the need for medication to address their public health crises. 100
The developing countries advanced the position that they have a broad
range of public health problems not limited to HIV/AIDS, and are con-
cerned with the lack of research that goes into the "neglected dis-
eases." 10 1 Moreover, developing countries wanted the recognition that
patents increase prices and impede access to many necessary medica-
tions.10 2 Therefore, developing countries wanted to freely use the TRIPS
flexibilities, "includ[ing] the compulsory licensing and parallel importa-
tion without being threatened by developed countries."' 10 3 In addition,
the developing world also wanted to eliminate the "predominately for
domestic use" provision of Article 31, and outsource generics from do-
mestic markets. 10 4
These demands lead to the creation of the Doha Declaration (Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health) in 2001.105 The decla-
ration confirmed that TRIPS "should be interpreted and implemented in
a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health
94. Brigitte Binkert, Why the Current Global Intellectual Property Framework Under
TRIPS is Not Working, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 143, 144 (2006).
95. Id.
96. Yu, supra note 5, at 864.
97. Binkert, supra note 95, at 145.
98. Brook Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO Ac-
tion Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 623 (2004).
99. Id. at 623-24.





105. Barton, supra note 1, at 149.
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and, in particular, to promote access to medications for all." 10 6 The dec-
laration allowed countries to use exceptions in TRIPS to the compulsory
licensing provision to address "public health crises, including those re-
lated to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics [that] can
represent a national emergency."' 0 7 While the agreement states that the
member nations "recognize the gravity of the public health problems af-
flicting many developing and least developed countries"' 08 and agree that
the "TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent members from
taking measures to protect public health,"' 0 9 the "Doha Declaration left
a technical legal problem unresolved."'I 10 The problem involves compul-
sory licensing for countries that lack manufacturing capabilities them-
selves. 1 ' Paragraph six of the Doha Declaration recognized that states
without manufacturing capabilities could face problems in making effec-
tive use of compulsory licensing and "instruct[ed] the council for TRIPS
to find an expeditious solution to this problem and report it to the Gen-
eral Council before 2002."'12 By 2002, all countries except the United
States agreed to a procedure that allowed for the use of compulsory li-
censing in order to meet the problems addressed in the Doha Declara-
tion. 113 The procedure allows generics that were created under
compulsory licenses to be exported to countries that lacked manufactur-
ing capacity.114 However, the United States feared that this grant would
be expanded to cover other types of products and was unwilling to accept
such a prospect.11 5 In 2003, the United States finally reached a compro-
mise and agreed to the procedure as long as the chairperson of the Gen-
eral Council of WTO made statements recognizing the United States'
concerns."16 To placate the United States, the chairperson made the
statement that "the agreement would be used 'in good faith to protect
public health' and [would] not be 'an instrument to pursue industry or
commercial policy objectives."' 117 He also stated that the WTO recog-
nized "the need to respond to the industry's concern that products pro-




108. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001: Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 41 I.L.M. 755 1 (2002) [herein-
after Doha Declaration].
109. Id. 4.
110. Barton, supra note 1, at 149.
111. Id.
112. Doha Declaration, supra note 108, 6.
113. Barton, supra note 1, at 149.
114. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and
TRIPS, http://www.wto.org/English/tratop-e/trips-e/public-health-faq-e.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008).
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Although the Doha Declaration will place more pressure on pharma-
ceutical companies to research neglected diseases and increase access to
these medications, many problems remain unresolved. 119 One of the ma-
jor issues that remains unresolved is how TRIPS and the Doha Declara-
tion will affect middle income countries such as China, Mexico, Brazil,
and India.120 Unlike the least developed countries, middle-income coun-
tries have manufacturing capabilities and will most likely not be able to
make use of the compulsory licensing exceptions. 121 For example, coun-
tries such as a Mexico and China agreed that they would only avail them-
selves of the compulsory licensing system if they were faced with
"circumstances of extreme urgency.' 22 Furthermore, bilateral free trade
agreements pre and post TRIP also greatly shape international patent
regulation and remove many of the TRIP flexibilities. 123 For example,
much of Mexico's patent reform had taken place before 1995, in response
to the passage of NAFTA. The next section will discuss the historical
context of patent protection in Mexico and how international patent reg-
ulation has transformed the Mexican pharmaceutical industry.
VIII. AN OVERVIEW OF PATENT REGULATION IN MEXICO
AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MEXICAN
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
The Mexican government established its ability to protect intellectual
property through its constitution. 124 The Mexican Constitution of 1917
gives the government broad authority to regulate economic development
and prohibit monopolies, except for certain governmental monopolies. 25
Mexico's first attempt to develop a patent system occurred in 1975 when
it passed the Law of Inventors.' 26 The Law of Inventors was greatly in-
fluenced by the Calvo doctrine, which stressed the importance of nation-
alism in the drafting of laws. Therefore, the law was intended to aid
Mexico's industrial development and was not supportive of the inventor.
Rather, it "eliminated the inventors' rights by reducing its monopoly
rights in patents, in order to benefit collective interests and increase the
nation's economic independence.' ' 127 In 1987, the Mexican government
amended the Law of Inventors to comply with the Paris Convention and
119. Id.
120. IAN FERGUSSON, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE WTO, INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS AND THE ACCESS TO MEDICINES CONTROVERSY, 4 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter CRS Report].
121. Although the procedure allowed the exportation of generics created through com-
pulsory licensing, many countries opted out. Id. at 6.
122. Id.
123. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [CIEL], The WHO & Intel-
lectual Property in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, 1 (2006), http://www.who.int/
phi/public-hearings/first/15Nov06DalindyeboShabalala.pdf.
124. Bacalski, supra note 85, at 724.
125. Id.
126. Farolan, supra note 73, at 54.
127. Id. at 57.
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increased patent protection "from ten to fourteen years.' 128 The greatest
amount of transformation, however, occurred with the passage of
NAFTA.
To foster modernization of Mexican industries and demonstrate its re-
solve to go through with the NAFTA negotiations, the Mexican govern-
ment agreed to reform its intellectual property laws. 129 In response to
NAFTA, Mexico passed the Law of Promotion and Protection of Indus-
trial Property (IPL) in 1993.130 The IPL increased patent protection from
fourteen to twenty years from the filing date and also required products
to be novel.' 3 ' In addition, the Mexican government created the Mexican
Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI). 132 This organization, which was
formed under the Secretariat of Commerce, has the primary function of
examining patents and "offer[ing] technical and professional help
through a consulting service. ' 133 The IMPI also has policing functions
and can "conduct inspections, gather information and [...] enforce viola-
tions to intellectual property rights."1 34
Currently, the Mexican pharmaceutical market is among the most de-
veloped in Latin America. In 2002, there were approximately 390 compa-
nies, both domestic and international, that manufactured pharmaceutical
products in Mexico. 135 Most of the indigenous manufacturers in Mexico
focus on generic drugs.1 36 The market is split between public and pri-
vate. 137 The public sector, which purchases drugs through governmental
agencies, serves 60 to 70 percent of the population but accounts for only
about 15 percent of the total financial value of the pharmaceutical mar-
ket. 138 Prices in the public market are also cheaper and tend to be one-
fifth of the price of comparable drugs sold in the private sector. 139 The
drugs purchased by the public sector must be generics. 140 On the other
hand, the private sector, or the Mexican pharmaceutical market, serves a
smaller segment of the population but accounts for 85 percent of the fi-
nancial value of the market.14' Similar to the U.S. market, many of these
companies are large multinational corporations that advertise and pro-
mote their products. 142 In contrast to the public market, the private mar-
ket can sell both generic and brand name drugs.' 43
128. Id.
Id.
129. Id. at 58.
130. Id. at 60
131. Id. at 61.
132. Id. at 58.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Bacalski, supra note 85, at 732.
136. Id.
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IX. HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS AFFECT ACCESS
TO TB DRUGS IN MEXICO
Even before the implementation of NAFTA or TRIPS, the absence of
strong patent protection did not prevent many multinational corporations
from breaking into the Mexican market and gaining strong market
shares. 144 In 1982, multinational firms controlled 72 percent of the phar-
maceutical market, mainly in the private market.145 Local firms concen-
trated their production mostly in the public field. 146 There was very weak
participation of the local firms in the private market because the cost of
competing and developing their own brand name in the private market
was prohibitive, while the cost to enter the public market was relatively
low. 147 Furthermore, because the public sector was the only buyer in the
public market, domestic firms did not have the incentive "to invest in
brand, image and commercialization."1 48 Consequently, this reluctance
of local firms to enter into the private market contributed to the delay in
the development of marketing skills. 149 Mexican domestic firms also
"have not been very entrepreneurial [... ] in R&D efforts for the devel-
opment of new molecules. '1 50 Therefore, even before patent protection
was introduced in Mexico, multinational companies had already wedged
their place in the private market, overshadowing many of the Mexican
domestic firms and possibly delimiting the effect of monopoly pricing on
drugs.
During the 1990s, Mexico experienced a strong period of decentraliza-
tion in its pharmaceutical industry. The passage of legislation that elimi-
nated barriers to foreign investment in Mexico and increased patent law
protection led to greater market concentration of large firms. 151 The
number of pharmaceutical firms dropped from 225 at the end of the 1980s
to 178 at the end of 2000.152 Many of the firms disappeared or were ac-
quired by multinational firms. 153 The private market increased from 72
percent in 1982 to almost 80 percent in 1998 to 1999.154 The public mar-
ket accounted for approximately 15 percent while the generic sector ac-
counted for 5 to 6 percent. 155
The introduction of patent protection has been followed by an upward
swing in drug prices. Between 1992 and 1993, prices increased by 20 to 25
144. Maria Pluvia Zuniga & Emmanuel Combe, Introducing Patent Protection in the
Pharmaceutical Sector: A First Evaluation of the Mexican Case, 16 REVUE REGION
El DtVELOPPEMENT 192 (2002).
145. Id. at 202.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 204.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 205.
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percent. 56 However, because most TB drugs are off-patent, the intro-
duction of patent regulation is not likely to affect the price of current TB
drugs. 157 Patent protection, however, stimulates the production of more
"me-too" drugs, which are very similar, modified versions of drugs al-
ready on the market. 158 Patents create this incentive because the creation
of imitative drugs instead of innovative drugs requires less research, less
money, and guarantees quicker patents.159 Most domestic Mexican firms
will be unable to pursue innovative drugs because, unlike multinational
corporations, they lack the infrastructure and resources to develop new
molecules. 160 Therefore, in order to compete Mexican firms may try to
emerge on the private market as generic producers of already off patent
medications. 16' Since the private market in Mexico tends to serve the
wealthiest population, this shift of local companies into the private mar-
ket may result in "difficulties to access new and better medicines which
would be commercialized only for the rich market."' 62
Aside from the possibility of creating an incentive to develop "me
-too" drugs, the effect of patents law on overall R&D priorities is ambig-
uous. 163 The presence of patents may create financial incentive for the
pharmaceutical firms to concentrate R&D in specific, profit-making, first
world diseases. 164 On the other hand, it may lead to more investment in
diseases that plague other parts of the world because "international mar-
kets are without a doubt one of the most important elements for pharma-
ceutical patents."'1 65 Thus, there is a chance that with the introduction of
patents there may be more research into TB medications. However, ten
years after the introduction of patents in Mexico, technological creation
in Mexico is negligible. 166 Determining the effect of patents on R&D is
premature at this point because it takes up to eight to ten years for a
chemical entity to the be developed. 167 Therefore, at a later point, fur-
ther research is needed to determine the actual affect of pharmaceutical
patents on R&D in Mexico. 168
156. Id. at 206.
157. Audio tape: Interview with Medical Anthropologist Dr. Paul Farmer, interview by
National Public Radio (Sept. 25, 2003), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=1446061.
158. Zuniga, supra note 146, at 195.
159. See generally Peter Lansbury, An Innovative Drug Industry? Well, No, WASHING-
TON POST, Nov. 16, 2003 at B02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/
wp-dyn/A43257-2003Nov14?language=printer (noting that in the United States.
the development of me -too drugs is common because modified versions of al-
ready existing drugs are patentable and profitable).
160. Zuniga, supra note 146, at 211.
161. Id. at 212.
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If an innovative drug is introduced on the market, the introduction of
stronger patent law creates entry barriers for generic companies because
these companies will be prohibited from entering the market when the
patent is in effect. 169 The entry barrier is also exacerbated by multina-
tional corporations that attempt to prolong the monopoly even after the
expiration of the patent. 170 This limitation of generic competition is rele-
vant to the access to TB drugs. If new TB drugs are invented they will be
subject to these patent regulations, prohibiting generic companies from
competing and reducing prices.1 71 Furthermore, the prohibition of ge-
neric competition of patented drugs further weakens Mexican domestic
producers. 172 Domestic producers will not be able to produce generic
versions of new drugs and produce income from exportation.1 73 Foster-
ing a strong generic industry is important to tackling diseases endemic to
the population. 74 Through encouraging a strong generic market in mid-
dle-income countries, domestic companies will gain more resources to in-
vest in the development of new innovative drugs, possibly leading to
greater research into neglected diseases. 75 However, currently Mexico's
exports are weak and will continue to weaken as patent laws
strengthen. 76
X. CONCLUSION
Mexico, like many middle-income countries, is a place of economic
contradictions. 177 While it is the eighth largest trading power in the
world, and one of the richest countries in Latin America, 178 in 2002 half
the Mexican population was living in poverty, and one fifth of the popula-
tion was living in extreme poverty.' 79 Mexico is a place where tuberculo-
sis still plagues its population and leads to approximately 2,248 deaths per
year.180
Unlike developed countries such as the United States, Mexico does not
have the same domestic capabilities and infrastructure to produce new
169. Id. at 207.
170. Id.
171. CRS Report, supra note 121, at 38.
172. See Jiao, supra note 4, at 670-672 (noting that partially developed countries such as
South Africa or India benefit from weakened patent laws because they allow the
domestic market to grow).
173. Id. at 673.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Zuniga, supra note 146, at 207 (stating that exports in Mexico are weak due to
tariff barriers and costly approval standards required abroad).
177. See generally Jiao, supra note 4, at 670.
178. See generally Gomez, supra note 71, at 53.
179. THE WORLD BANK, Poverty in Mexico - Fact Sheet, http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/MEXICOEXTN/0,,contentMD
K:20233967-pagePK:141137-piPK:141127-theSitePK:338397,00.html.
180. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TB Country Profile for Mexico, http://www.
who.int/globalatlas/predefinedreports/tb/PDFFiles/mex.pdf (last visited Nov. 23,
2008).
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drugs.1 81 Even if Mexican pharmaceutical companies were able to pro-
duce new drugs, they would not be able to enjoy patent protection at the
same level of many multinational companies.18 2 Because domestic Mexi-
can companies are relatively weak compared to their multinational coun-
terparts, 8- they do not have the infrastructure necessary to enforce their
patents. 8 4 It is important to remember that, "It]here is a crucial differ-
ence between a patent system that allows international companies to ef-
fectively enforce their domestic patents and a patent system that allows
an emerging domestic industry to protect its intellectual property interna-
tionally."' 185 It appears that the international patent system incorporated
in Mexico has encouraged multinational companies to enforce patents
rather than domestic companies. Having a strong domestic pharmaceuti-
cal industry is advantageous to the public health and wellbeing of the
country.1 86 Many multinational corporations are driven by profit instead
of the pressing public health needs of international populations. 187 Do-
mestic producers in Mexico, however, may have more of a vested interest
in the health of the population and will be more likely to manufacture TB
drugs. Under the international patent law system, there is very little
room for Mexican domestic producers to grow. Therefore, having a weak
intellectual property law system that gives domestic companies the flexi-
bility to develop and innovate will likely lead to greater access to certain
drugs. 188
It can be argued that the implementation of NAFTA or TRIPS did not
have a large impact on access to TB drugs for two main reasons. First,
multinational corporations were already present in the Mexican market
prior to the implementation of patents,'189 and second, most of the TB
drugs available are already off patent.190 Nevertheless, stronger patent
laws may hinder effective long-term TB control. Patent laws create an
incentive to pursue too many drugs rather than innovative medications
that would help quell the epidemic. 91 As previously mentioned, the
complexity of the TB regimen, potential side effects, and emerging resis-
181. See Zuniga, supra note 146, at 205 (explaining that domestic firms have not had the
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their patents).
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tance demand greater research into TB medication. 192 If, however, pat-
ents encourage pharmaceutical companies to pursue profit-making
medications prevalent in the developed world instead of neglected dis-
eases such as TB, countries such as Mexico may not be able to meet the
challenges faced by this epidemic.
The existence of stringent global patent laws is a reality that Mexico
has dealt with for more than a decade.1 93 The stringent patents may be
beneficial as they provide incentives for research and development. 194
But the likelihood of this research meeting the demands of neglected dis-
eases such as TB is more questionable. 195 To help alleviate the possibility
of neglected diseases becoming even more neglected, the Mexican gov-
ernment has taken important strides in making sure that the public health
demands of its population are met.196 For example, the Mexican govern-
ment implemented the 1997 General Law of Health that promotes the
production of generic drugs. 197 The government is also in the process of
developing a universal social insurance scheme to make sure that the fifty
million uninsured Mexicans have the ability to pay for medication and
other health care needs. 198
In addition to changes in governmental policy, changes in pharmaceuti-
cal incentive schemes may help alleviate the possible negative effect of
patents. 199 For example, by implementing financial rewards to pharma-
ceutical companies for positive health care outcomes, companies may
have more of an incentive to produce drugs based on the public health
care needs of a society.200 Furthermore, by creating "open access drug
discovery entities," which are institutions for academic and industry col-
laboration, there may be more research into neglected diseases such as
TB. 20 I Therefore, while patents may negatively affect access to and inno-
vation of certain types of drugs, there are possible solutions to counter
192. Richard J. O'Brien & Andrew A. Vernon, New Tuberculosis Drug Development:
How Can We Do Better?, 157 AM. J. RESPIR'Y & CRIT. CARE MED. 1705 (1998).
193. Zuniga, supra note 146, at 203.
194. CRS Report, supra note 121, at 11.
195. Ellen't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A
Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 46 (2002).
196. Julio Frenk et al., Comprehensive Reform to Improve Health System Performance
in Mexico, 368 LANCET 1524, 1524 (2006).
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201. Id. "Open access drug discovery entities can be envisioned as contract-based
frameworks and sites for collaborations between academics and industry and
among companies. Pharmaceutical companies would be enlisted as hosts in sev-
eral geographic regions and, on a fee for service basis, open sectors of their R&D
facilities to approved scientists from academia or other drug companies." Id. As
MSF states, this kind of collaboration "would offer a crucial logistic solution, al-
lowing close collaboration among academic and industry scientists and eliminating
the drawbacks of managing virtual drug discovery within large international con-
sortia." Id.
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the effect. 2112
The effect of patents on TB is under researched and much is left to
speculation. 2113 This may be due to the fact that many of the TB drugs are
off-patents, and therefore, stringent patent laws may not greatly affect the
current drugs. 20 4 This note does not attempt to positively assert that pat-
ents will necessarily negatively affect TB innovation or access, nor does it
attempt to say that the presence of patents will increase access and inno-
vation in the field of TB. Instead this paper attempts to give a general
overview of international patent laws and give some insight as to how
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